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"We live in an era of interdependence," 
Keohane and Nye 
INTRODUCTION 
OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this study is to determine if international 
regime theories have any value when examining regime formation 
among small to mid range powers. In addressing this question I 
will focus this study on the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN). 
First I will overview international regime theory. Second, 
I will briefly discuss Southeast Asia as a region both 
geographically and politically. I will also describe the 
previous attempts at regional organization in the region prior to 
ASEAN. Thirdly, I will analyze the formative years of ASEAN 
which for the purposes of this study will be from 1967 to 1975. 
Additionally I will briefly discuss ASEAN activities from 1975 
until 1994. After completing these portions of the paper I will 
determine whether or not ASEAN was or contained a regime during 
its formative years. Here I will be asking the additional 
question of how does a regime transform into an organization. I 
believe the data will show that ASEAN was a regime during its 
formative years. Specifically, it was or contained a security 
regime during this time period. In addition, upon determining if 
there was a regime, I will use appendices A and B to ask specific 
questions about ASEAN as a regime. Appendix A is a series of 
questions that allow us to compare and contrast one regime with 
another. Appendix B is a template of regime formation theories 
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to be tested. In the conclusion I will return to the central 
question of this study (i.e., does international regime theory 
have any value when examining regime formation among small to mid 
range powers?) 
HETHODOLOGY 
The research methodology utilized for researching these 
questions is historical in nature. Hy primary research tool was 
Horris Library and other sources for published works. The 
templates in appendix A and B are from Oran Young's works (Young, 
1989. 29), (Young and Oshernko. 1993. 263-266). 
I expect the results of my study to disprove the theory that 
a hegemon is necessary for the formation of a regime. However, I 
also expect to find that individual leadership is a necessary 
component of regime formation, and without strong leadership by 
one or more individuals regime formation will be unlikely to take 
place. 1 
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"What is most striking, ... is the sheer number of international 
regimes." 
Oran Young 
REGIME THEORY 
We live in a world of increasing complexity and 
interdependence. But, as Robert Keohane points out, 
"interdependence in the world political economy generates 
conflict" (Keohane 1984. 243). With the rising complexity of the 
world political economy, it becomes even more important for 
nation states to find ways to cooperate. So, how do nations 
cooperate in this new environment of increasing complexity and 
interdependence? The answer to this question in many issue areas 
is through international regimes, which have increased 
dramatically in number since World War II. Quite simply, we live 
in a world full of international regimes and they are not going 
away. Realization of this fact has led to the study of 
international regimes by political scientists in the hope of 
finding explanations for regime formation, change, and decay. In 
addition, if cooperation is to be fostered and conflicts avoided, 
an increased number of regimes may be an attainable alternative 
to a world government. 
When thinking of regimes it may be useful to think of a 
traffic light, which can be a nuisance at midnight when no other 
cars are around but extremely helpful or even life saving during 
the Monday morning rush. Like traffic lights, regimes can 
facilitate the interactions of nations during times of crisis 
(i.e., rush hour) and peace (i.e., midnight). However, to extend 
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the traffic light analogy, one of the key questions for regimes, 
is, who provides the traffic light? The hegemon or users of the 
intersection? If a hegemon provides the light, does it control 
the timing when the light turns from red to green (what about 
yellow)? Or as the hegemon wanes, do nations share the expense 
for the light? If the expense for providing the light is shared 
among nations, does the hegemon retain control or is control of 
the traffic light shared? These are the types of questions that 
the literature on regimes has addressed over the last twenty 
years. 
The types of international regimes are almost endless, 
ranging from security regimes to monetary and commodity regimes. 
But what exactly is a regime? And how do we differentiate 
between an international regime and an international 
organization? At least four definitions of regimes have been 
proposed over the last fifteen years. The most influential is 
that of Stephen Krasner, who defines international regimes as 
"principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around 
which actor expectations converge in a given issue area" (Krasner 
1983: 1). The second and possibly the most comprehensive is 
Donald Puchala and Raymond Hopkins argument that "for every 
political system, there is a corresponding regime" 
(Krasner 1983: 62). The Third and most specific definition 
defines regimes as multilateral agreements between nation states 
within a given issue area (Haggard and Simmons 1987: 495). The 
fourth and most recent definition comes from a conference held at 
Dartmouth college in 1992. At the conference fifteen scholars 
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studying international regimes defined them as "social 
institutions composed of agreed-upon principles, norms, rules, 
and decision-making procedures that govern the interactions of 
actors in specific issue areas" (Young and Osherenko 1993). In 
other words regimes are social institutions, and like many social 
institutions they mayor may not be formally articulated or 
organized. 
In addition to an agreed upon definition of what is an 
international regime it is important that there is a delineation 
between international regimes and other international 
institutions. Robert Keohane addressed this in the edited 
volume, Regime Theory and International Relations in which he 
writes; "International institutions include formal 
intergovernmental or transnational organizations, international 
regimes, and conventions. International organizations are 
purposive entities, with bureaucratic structures and leadership, 
permitting them to respond to events. International regimes are 
institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments, 
that pertain to particular sets of issues in international 
relations. Conventions are informal institutions, with implicit 
rules and understandings that shape the expectations of actors" 
(Rittberger 1993: 28-29). 
The last twenty years have seen a myriad journal articles 
and books published on the formation, change and decline of 
regimes 2 resulting in different theories from the different 
schools of thought (realist, functionalist, etc). In general, 
four theories recur throughout the literature, distinguished by 
7  
whether they are power based, interest based, knowledge based, or 
focused on contextual factors. 3 In addition to theories of 
regime formation there have been numerous attempts to explain 
regime change and decay (strength, organizational form, scope, 
and allocational modes).4 Furthermore, there have been 
additional completely theoretical approaches to change which 
include game-theory and cognitive approaches. S 
REGIME FORMATION 
The most popular and parsimonious theory of regime formation 
is power based in the sense that it assumes the formation of 
regimes depends on the power configuration in the international 
system. The most widely accepted and discussed power based 
theory is the Hegemonic Stability theory, which postulates that 
the most powerful state in the global order facilitates and forms 
regimes. Furthermore, the hegemon not only maintains a 
regime(s), but its continued involvement is necessary for the 
maintenance of a regime(s). The theory also postulates that 
regime decline can be traced to the decline of the hegemon 
itself. The hegemon does not act out of benevolent kindness but 
rather sees the cost of providing for the regime as being less 
than the benefits received. 
This theory has developed two sub-schools of thought. 
The first holds that a benign hegemon provides regime(s) as a 
public good regardless of other nation's ability to contribute 
because it feels the benefits outweigh the costs. The other view 
maintains that the hegemon uses its dominant position to impose 
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regimes on other actors, regardless of the consequences for the 
actors that the regime is imposed upon. In addition, some power 
based theories list other aspects that need to be taken into 
account when examining regime formation. These include but are 
not limited to the balance of power between nations, and the 
ideological outlook of potential regime members. 
These mayor may not have relevance depending on what type of 
regime is being examined. These factors and others connected 
with the power based approach are in the template for examining 
regime formation (see appendix B). 
In addition to the power based approach, some theorists of 
regime formation stress factors other than power as being the 
prime reasons for regime formation. Arguing that only by 
examining the organizational form, scope or range of issues 
covered, and the resource allocation can the actual cause of 
regime formation be determined (i.e., cognitive, or interest 
based theories, see appendix B). 
REGIME ·CHANGE 
The approaches to regime change bear a resemblance to works 
on regime formation and are more extensive. The works are mostly 
structural and power based and utilize the hegemonic approach. 
Starting with the premise that a hegemon is necessary, they go on 
to examine the decline or change in international regimes. Most 
work centers around the so called period of American Hegemony and 
its subsequent decline. 6 Strategic and game-theory approaches 
have also sought to explain regime change and behavior. 
However, with these theories "the attended risk is 
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oversimplification," as noted by Haggard and Simmons. Another 
approach is the functionalist approach which attempts to "explain 
behaviors of institutions in terms of their effects" (Haggard and 
Simmons 1987: 506). The last approach is the cognitive approach 
which argues that "learning and, in a somewhat different fashion, 
ideology, affect international rules and cooperation by showing 
the merit (or futility) of certain lines of action" (Haggard and 
Simmons 1987: 508). The appeal of this approach is that 
ideological and like thinking in certain issue areas seem to have 
a causal relationship with regime formation and change. An 
example of this would be the GATT and the consensus supporting 
free trade. However, as Haggard and Simmons point out, sorting 
out the influence of ideology and the influence of shared 
knowledge can at best prove extremely difficult. Lastly, when 
examining regime change research should also take into account 
the domestic affairs of nations comprising the regime. This 
examination needs to be undertaken particularly when the regime 
is suspected of influencing the policy makers of a country 
(Haggard and Simmons 1987), (Young and Osherenko 1993). 
SUHHARY 
With the growing interdependence of the world and the 
increasing numbers of international regimes it is important that 
an attempt be made to understand the dynamics of international 
regimes. This takes on greater relevance as the borders of the 
world melt away with the advent of increased communication and 
transportation means at the disposal of both government and 
nongovernmental actors. This is even more important when one 
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considers that many transnational actors outside the control of 
formal governments have significant impact on regimes. An 
example of this would be the declining control that central banks 
exercise over the money regime. 
However, most of the works on international regimes have 
centered on European/Western, hegemonic, and natural resource 
regimes. ASEAN does not fit in any of these categories and thus 
provides an opportunity to test the broader relevance of 
conclusions drawn from studying them. Failure of existing 
theories to explain the ASEAN case will raise doubts about their 
universality. 
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SOUTHEAST ASIA 
Strategically located between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, 
the nations of Southeast Asia sit astride the main sea lanes 
between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. The significance of 
these maritime routes to the world economy is evident in the 
quantity of material that Japan alone receives via these routes. 
In 1982 it was reported that "Every day of the year more than 
700,00 tons of crude oil and 110,000 tons of iron ore are put 
ashore in Japanese ports. Some 90 percent of each of these vital 
raw materials pass through the Straits of Malacca and the Lombok 
Straits" (Tilman 1987: 107). Unequivocally, the region's sea 
lanes are an integral part of the international economy and of 
vital interest to the entire industrialized world. Furthermore, 
mainland Southeast Asia has been and continues to be viewed as a 
gateway to China's southern provinces. Thus for these and other 
reasons the region has attracted considerable attention from 
extra-regional powers. 
The region consists of ten nations that are divisible into 
two distinct geographical divisions. First is the mainland group 
composed of Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam. A 
second geographical division is the insular cluster consisting of 
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore. The 
region can be further subdivided into three political groups. 
First is Indochina composed of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. A 
second is the self imposed isolation of Burma. The third and 
largest political subgroup is the six nations that comprise the 
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Association of Southeast Asian Nations (i.e., Brunei, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore). 
In order to understand the region's politics and current 
borders a historical understanding of the region is necessary. 
The region has had a long period of European colonization with 
the first being the Portuguese possession of Malacca in 1511. 
Shortly thereafter the Spanish claimed the Philippines and the 
Dutch claimed Java. In 1641 the Dutch ousted the Portuguese from 
Malacca. The French and English arrived in the late eighteenth 
century interested in the China trade and turned their attention 
towards mainland nations of Thailand, Burma and Indochina. The 
British took Malacca from the Dutch then occupied Singapore. In 
addition the British colonized Burma, North Boreno and part of 
Brunei. The French first began their contact in Southeast Asia 
with missionaries in Indochina. This led to an interest with the 
China trade as they began their occupation of Indochina. Upon 
completion of the French colonization of Indochina only Thailand 
remained independent. Thailand was allowed to retain its 
independence to serve as a buffer state between the French and 
British. In 1896 the Spanish lost the Philippines when the 
Filipinos revolted for independence with American support. 
However, after defeating the Spanish the United States continued 
the period of colonization by occupying the Philippines. 
Thus, from the start of the twentieth century until World 
War II, all the nations of Southeast Asia had been colonized by 
the Europeans except Thailand. World War II changed the 
political face of the region. The defeat and expulsion of the 
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Europeans and Americans by the Japanese marked the end of the 
colonial era and sparked the struggle for independence. It took 
numerous years for all the foreign powers to relinquish their 
claims to the region, but the aura of the invincibility of the 
Europeans and the subservience of the region was ended. Some 
results of the colonial era and World War II were a distrust of 
the Japanese and an awakening of nationalism in the region. The 
first nation to gain independence after 350 years of foreign rule 
was the Philippines. Indonesia gained its independence after a 
bloody struggle with the Dutch in 1949. Malaysia negotiated 
peacefully with the British and gained independence in 1957. 
Singapore received independence in 1963 and united with the 
Malaysian federation. Shortly thereafter, in 1965 Singapore left 
the Malaysian federation and became fully independent. Burma 
gained independence from the British in 1948 after a short period 
of violent opposition to the British. The Indochinese states had 
a much rougher road, with Vietnam achieving reunification as a 
nation in 1975. Laos ended its violent civil war in 1975 and 
accepted a special relationship with Vietnam. Cambodia continued 
to be a zone of intense turmoil and conflict well into the 1990s. 
When considering regional cooperation it must be noted that 
prior to the arrival of the Europeans the idea of nationalism was 
an unknown concept. The political power in the region centered 
around the capitols and their rulers. These rulers lost their 
influence as the distance from the throne increased with no clear 
boundaries, only frontiers between nations. Even today this 
concept of a loss of control as the distance from major cities 
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increases is still evident in the region. Examples include the 
outlying islands in insular Southeast Asia and the highlanders 
versus the lowlanders on the mainland. 
Additionally, foreign drawn borders are not always 
reflective of pre-existing geographical and ethnic and religious 
boundaries. This colonial legacy of foreign drawn borders has 
proven to be a difficult problem both in Southeast Asia and other 
areas of the world. The region also has to deal with religious 
prejudices, ethnic conflicts and animosities, and numerous 
territorial disputes. These factors combined, make the concept 
of regional cooperation difficult. 
Following World War II Southeast Asia was again thrust into 
an extra-regional conflict. With the rise of the Cold War the 
nations of Southeast Asia became a de facto battle ground between 
the capitalistic free world and revolutionary communism. The 
Soviet Union, China, and the United States have each influenced 
the region differently as their views of the region changed. In 
response to this quagmire of hegemonic conflict the nations of 
Southeast Asia found themselves having to decide what path to 
take. Briefly, by the early 1960s Burma had chosen isolation. 
The Philippines after a previous period of close ties with the 
United States chose to continue their relationship with the 
United States. Indonesia chose an independent, left leaning 
course under Sukarno with the PKI (the Indonesian communist 
party) gaining considerable influence. Following the demise of 
Sukarno in 1965, General Suharto (later president) continued an 
independent course but destroyed the communist presence in 
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Indonesia. North Vietnam aligned first with the Chinese, then 
with Soviets, and South Vietnam with the United States. Thailand 
aligned with the United States and like the Philippines allowed 
American troops to be stationed there. Malaysia supported U.S. 
regional policy as did Singapore. Under Prince Sihanouk, 
Cambodia took a middle of the road path trying to play one side 
against another, Laos was split and embroiled in a civil war in 
the 1950s and 1960s. Brunei was still a British protectorate and 
remained so until 1984. One factor that each nation shared in 
the post World War II period was an active communist presence. 
Both the Soviet Union and China supported the revolutionary 
activities of these groups. 
In summary, "Geography, history, language, and culture have 
all conspired against the countries of ASEAN to make their tasks 
of nation building and economic development more difficult. Of 
the five countries considered here only Thailand has any 
reasonable claim to nationhood, described in its ideal form by 
Rupert Emerson as "a single people, traditionally fixed on a 
well-defined territory, speaking the same language and preferably 
a language all its own, possessing a distinctive culture, and 
shaped to a common mold by many generations of shared historical 
experience." Within the ASEAN states, the search for nationhood 
has been and continues to be, a major concern of every regime" 
(Tilman 1987: 154). 
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EARLY ATTEMPTS AT COOPERATION 
The first attempt at a regional organization and cooperation 
in the region was the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization founded 
in 1954 (SEATO). SEATO was not initiated by the region's nations 
themselves, but rather it was initiated and backed by the United 
States in line with its containment policy against Communist 
China. SEATO lasted until 1977, but was never more than a 
security alliance with the U.S. and had no real affect on 
regional cooperation (the only actual Southeast Asian members 
were Thailand and the Philippines). The second attempt at 
regional organization and cooperation and the first without extra 
regional membership was the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA). 
ASA, initiated in 1961 by Malaysia, Thailand, and the 
Philippines, "was intended to be an embryonic alternative rather 
than a substitute for SEATO" (Leifer 1989: 28). ASA's goal was 
to promote economic and cultural cooperation. The organization 
had a brief life lasting only six years, collapsing over the 
conflicting claims to Sabah by both the Philippines and Malaysia. 
Maphilindo was another attempt at regional organization 
undertaken in 1963. This attempt was a proposed confederation of 
the three Malay speaking countries of Southeast Asia, Indonesia, 
Malaysia and the Philippines. Maphilindo also proved to be short 
lived, collapsing as a result of armed conflict between Indonesia 
and Malaysia. Though these two attempts at regional organization 
collapsed, they showed that the leaders of the region perceived a 
need for regional cooperation. It seems that these organizations 
failed for four reasons: 
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- Lack of membership (particularly Indonesia the largest of 
non-communist nations) 
- The governments were immature and unstable 
- The nations were not ready to commit to an organization 
- The norms and principles necessary for cooperation were 
not ingrained by the regional leaders 
Nonetheless, these attempts at regional cooperation proved 
valuable for ASEAN. ASA in particular served as guide for 
cooperation while Maphilindo provided declaratory inspiration 
(Leifer 1989: 29). Moreover, each of the nations that were to 
form ASEAN faced a similar set of problems that their governments 
wanted to resolve or at least mediate. The most important of 
these shared problems was the need for internal stability on 
.which to build not only the individual nations but to preserve 
the power bases of national elites. These elites all had an 
inclination towards at least some form of capitalism. The 
nations that were to comprise ASEAN also were all anti-communist. 
Some elites were anti-communist for purely ideological reasons, 
but what they all feared most was the continued instability that 
the communist insurgencies were causing in each of their nations. 
Yet none of them, though desiring a stable environment, were 
ready to sacrifice any sovereignty to a higher goal such as an 
international organization. 
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"ASEAN exists because it serves a need." 
Malaysian Prime Minister 
ASEAH 
1961-1911 
Within the aforementioned climate a consensus emerged among 
the non-communist nations was reached that a regional 
organization was necessary. Thus, the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nation was established in 1961 with the signing of the 
Bangkok Declaration by the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand (Brunei became 
a member in 1984). Drawing on the principles of ASA, the ASEAN 
declaration stated its primary purpose and aims were to: 
"To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural 
development in the region through joint endeavors in the spirt of 
equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation 
for a prosperous and peaceful community of South-East Asian 
Nations" (appendix C). 
However, the implied purpose was to promote political stability 
and regional security in response to the perceived communist 
threat. 
But what were the bases of cooperation? The record shows 
that no nation was willing to sacrifice national interests for 
the sake of a regional institution. Still each member must have 
perceived at least some potential gains from joining. 
Yet after signing the Bangkok Declaration was ASEAN a regime 
or an entity that contained a regime? On initial examination and 
utilizing Krasner's and Keohane's definition of international 
regimes (see above), ASEAN seems to have constituted a regime. 
Specifically it constituted a security regime because the 
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specific issue area on which ASEAN primarily focused attention 
was the achievement of internal security through regional peace 
and stability. At the macro level each of the founding members 
desired this, but in the beginning the shared "principles, norms 
and decison-making procedures" that are defining characteristics 
of a regime were absent (Krasner 1983: 1). However, the nations 
that founded ASEAN realized that this lack was a hindrance to 
regional cooperation and therefore to the achievement of a core 
value for each of them. 
"The five founding governments of ASEAN were drawn together 
by a recognition of the self-defeating and wasteful nature of 
contention among neighboring states ... " (Leifer 1989: 1). The 
leaders of the nations realized these fundamental problems and 
hoped to establish some principles and norms that they could 
agree on. This is why the foreign ministers met in Bangkok, 
taking the first step towards cooperation by agreeing to 
disagree. This view of ASEAN's formation was clearly articulated 
by the Prime Minister of Thailand at the 1976 Bali Summit. "The 
Association has given our respective countries the framework 
within which to strengthen social, economic and cultural ties 
among ourselves, and to develop cooperation where, hitherto, none 
had existed" (ASEAN 1978:103). This objective of trying to find 
issues were cooperation could take place is contained in the 
preamble of the Bangkok declaration: 
"Mindful of the existence of mutual interest and common 
problems among countries of South-East Asia and convinced of the 
need to strengthen further the existing bonds of regional 
solidarity and cooperation" (appendix C). 
20 
The declaration established ASEAN as loose and decentralized 
with the foreign ministers of each member making up the highest 
decision making authority. A standing committee consisted of the 
Foreign Minister and the resident ambassadors of the four other 
members in the host nation for the year, and so the chairman and 
membership rotated annually. Structural machinery was 
established for committees to study specific areas but these were 
primarily ad-hoc. Further highlighting the decentralized 
structure of ASEAN during this period was that each country had 
its own national secretariat. The reason for adopting such a 
decentralized structure in 1967 was the fear of a loss of control 
or sovereignty to a centralized institution. The founding 
members had common fears and concerns, but no consensus existed 
among the region's leaders on how to resolve them. This was due 
to national perceptions of both internal and domestic problems. 
But what were each nation's reasons for joining ASEAN? 
Indonesia played a pivotal role in ASEAN's founding as the 
largest and most populous nation of Southeast Asia, and it is 
arguable that without its acquiescence and leadership the 
organization would have never came into being. After the demise 
of Sukarno following a coup attempt in 1965, Indonesia under 
Suharto "renounced radical nationalism" but did not want to ally 
with either the communist or the free world (Leifer 1989: 1). 
The assumption of power by Suharto had the effect of "expanding 
significantly a pattern of conformity in political outlook 
already encompassing Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and the 
Philippines" (Leifer 1989: 1). Further, "In 1966, Suharto's New 
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Order government, dominated by the armed forces, but with the 
advice of Western-educated technocrats, embarked on a program of 
economic rehabilitation and development" (Palmer 1987: 32). 
These priorities moved Indonesia to seek regional stability and 
thus to see advantage in joining a regional organization. 
Suharto also envisioned Indonesian leadership in the Association, 
evident by both the choice of location for ASEAN's headquarters 
(Jakarta) and the first meeting of ASEAN leaders in 1976 (Bali). 
Malaysia's motivation for joining ASEAN was the view that 
the region's best prospects for growth and stability hinged on 
removing extra-regional powers from Southeast Asia. This view 
was understandable after the long fight with a communist 
insurgency that was rumored to be supported by China. Malaysia 
saw in ASEAN the opportunity to promote the concept of 
neutralizing the region from great power interference. Thus 
Malaysia become the prime mover behind ASEAN's eventual adoption 
of a Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1972. 
Singapore, severed from Malaysia by irreconcilable ethnic 
differences only two years after joining the federation, was 
striving in 1967 to develop a Southeast Asian identity. 
Sandwiched between Malaysia and Indonesia, and both promoting 
some type of regional cooperation, Singapore had little choice 
but to go along with the regional tide. Joining ASEAN also 
helped to ease the fears and suspicions of other nations who saw 
Singapore as a Chinese outpost. In addition Singapore's leader 
Lee Kuan Yew saw in ASEAN a vehicle to gain additional support of 
the island republic's sovereignty status. However, Singapore's 
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strong anti-communist bent and sense of vulnerability caused 
Singapore to support a U. S. military presence in the region. 
This later led to resistance by Singapore to Malaysia's proposal 
for neutralizing the region from great power involvement. The 
relationship between Indonesia and Singapore also was strained 
but after realizing the importance that President Suharto placed 
on ASEAN, Lee Kuan Yew took great pains to establish a close 
personal relationship with Suharto (Leifer 1989: 40). 
Thailand, with the longest land borders of any ASEAN state, 
was deeply concerned with the communist insurgencies both at home 
and in its neighbors Laos and Cambodia. The Thais' also feared 
the long term consequences of the Vietnamese conflict. Under 
military and strongly anti-communist governments, Thailand not 
only supported U.S. involvement in Vietnam but allowed the basing 
of U.S. troops within her own boundaries. Furthermore, in 
response to President Johnson's "Many Flags Program" and to 
ensure continued defense support from the U.S., Thailand 
dispatched its first contingent of troops to South Vietnam in 
September 1967 (Leifer 1989. 84). Nevertheless, Thailand saw 
security advantages to joining ASEAN and hosted the delegation of 
foreign ministers to formally sign the ASEAN Declaration. 
The Philippines security was guaranteed by the U.S. and so 
it joined less for security reasons than for long term economic 
prospects. In addition the Philippines shared the concern of 
other members for communist movements within their own borders. 
Though all the founding members had various reasons for 
seeking membership they all shared some commonalties that 
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ultimately helped to make the Bangkok Declaration possible. 
First, the governments of each nation were conservative in nature 
and held "a common belief that political stability and continuity 
of leadership should assume priority over political participation 
in order to create the necessary climate for rapid economic 
growth" (Job 1993. 152). 
Still, even with the desire to cooperate ASEAN, narrowly 
averted collapsing during the first two years of its existence 
because the Philippines revived a claim to Sabah. In addition, 
tensions existed between Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia over 
control and accesses to shared maritime routes. Thailand and 
Malaysia had to contend with a border drawn during the colonial 
era that did not reflect the actual human geography (i.e. the 
ethnic Muslim population) which was a source of friction between 
the two. 
From ASEAN's founding in 1967 until 1971, the annual Foreign 
Ministers meetings did not accomplish anything concrete other 
then to agree to continue consultations. The communique released 
after Fourth Ministerial meeting in Manila in 1971 failed even to 
mention the widening war in Indochina or the fall of Cambodia's 
government under Prince Sihanouk (Leifer 1989: 53). Nevertheless 
support continued for ASEAN because if nothing else the 
uncertainty of the region forced them to continue to make 
attempts at cooperation. 
By Keohane's definition of international institutions (see 
above), until 1972 ASEAN was neither an international 
organization nor a regime. It was not an organization because 
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the loose structure did not provide for clearly articulated 
purposes, bureaucratic structures or leadership which would have 
permitted them to respond to events such as the fall of 
Cambodia's government. As discused above, during this period no 
issue area or even norms or principles existed to classify ASEAN 
as a regime. But, by the actions and movement towards agreement 
in certain issue areas, ASEAN might be considered an embryonic 
regime, although it was not shaping the expectations of its 
members. In addition in 1971 ASEAN had not received recognition 
from any of the great powers, nor had ASEAN as an entity met with 
other international organizations. It was not until 1972 that 
the ASEAN delegates to the United Nation held their first caucus 
(Leifer 1989: 53). In retrospect just holding together as an 
entity was a significant accomplishment 1967 until 1972. This 
period helped to establish relationships between the ruling 
elites of the different nations, which according to knowledge 
based regime formation theories is necessary for effective regime 
formation. 
1972-1977 
The turning point for ASEAN came in 1972 in response to 
regional events. The most significant of these events was Henry 
Kissenger's visit to Beijing, which precipitated the above 
mentioned first caucus of ASEAN delegates at the United Nations. 
However, the delegation was unable to define a common stand on 
the People's Republic of China taking China's seat at the United 
Nations (Leifer 1989: 53). The assumption of the United Nations 
seat by the People's Republic in October 1971 and President 
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Nixon's decision to disengage from Vietnam forced the members of 
ASEAN to improve cooperation, Though not in complete agreement 
on how to proceed, action was undertaken on the Malaysian 
proposal for a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, The 
initial Malaysian proposal called for guarantees by the great 
powers but this was rejected in favor of a watered downed 
version. The dilution was necessary because Thailand and the 
Philippines, close allies with the U.S., supported the U.S. 
presence not only in the region but in South Vietnam. 
Nonetheless, all member in November 1971 at Kuala Lumpur, 
ratified the ZOPFAN declaration (appendix F). The declaration 
contained the collective commitment that: 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand are determined to exert initially necessary 
efforts to secure the recognition of, respect for, South 
East Asia a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free 
form any form of manner of interference of outside powers; 
that the South East Asian countries should make concerted 
efforts to broaden the areas of co-operation which would 
contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer 
relationship (appendix F). 
The most important result of this meeting was not the 
declaration itself, which even the signatories knew was 
unobtainable, but that ASEAN cooperation was increasing. "It 
indicated the semblance of a diplomatic community as it became 
increasingly necessary for regional partners to forge a common 
response to common regional problems" (Leifer 1989: 58). Yet 
even with this accomplishment ASEAN was still not a united group. 
One could argue that at this point the leaders of ASEAN viewed it 
as a club for senior officials to meet and discuss various 
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regional issues but it had no impact on the decision making 
processes. The cease-fire talks between North Vietnam and the 
United States in Paris and inevitable fall of South Vietnam 
highlighted the need for increased cooperation in order to be 
prepared for the post-war situation. 
In 1971 the United Nations issued a report on ASEAN 
cooperation which had the effect of increasing cooperation 
between the member nations. In the area of economic cooperation 
the report had a catalytic effect on the organizational efforts 
of ASEAN. The United Nations report showed that "clearly, the 
organization could not continue to operate under the direction of 
the foreign ministers, particularly in the economic field" 
(Palmer 1987: 42). The impact of the report was important for 
ASEAN's evolution because it focused attention on the 
association's stated purpose, of economic cooperation. This was 
significant because even though the permanent committees had no 
real impact on the decision making process it increased 
consultations at many other levels. A significant step towards 
the reality of an organization was taken in 1973 with the holding 
of joint strategy sessions to prepare for the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) meetings (Palmer 1987, 43). 
Consequently, by 1973 cooperation had increased and at the 
Seventh Ministerial Meeting the issue of establishing a Central 
ASEAN Secretariat was discussed. The Singapore Foreign Minister 
stated "Unless we consolidate ourselves in economic cooperation, 
it would be difficult for others to regard ASEAN seriously" 
(Palmer 1987, 44). Thus by 1974 it could be argued that ASEAN 
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had evolved dramatically toward becoming an international 
organization, and may have at this point contained a regime. A 
regime with the norm that member nations should undertake joint 
consultations prior to approaching other international entities 
such as the GATT. However internal drift remained high. An 
example, was the decision by the Philippines and Thailand to 
establish diplomatic ties with the Peoples Republic of China, 
which was not received with enthusiasm in Jakarta (Leifer 1987: 
65). Moreover, the Indonesian decision to annex East Timor 
received an adverse resolution from the United Nations with 
Singapore abstaining from a vote of support. Singapore felt it 
could not support this move for fear of its own sovereignty 
(Leifer 1987: 65). The primary reason that ASEAN did not 
collapse during this period can be traced to the continued 
communist insurgency in the region and the fear of becoming 
dominos in the Cold War battles between communism and the free 
world. 
For ASEAN the impetus to transform into a bonafide 
international institution was the success of revolutionary 
communism in Indochina in 1975. Though scheduled earlier, the 
eighth ASEAN ministerial meeting was held in Kuala Lumpur only 
two weeks after the fall of Siagon. It was at this meeting that 
the foreign ministers "took up the agenda of economic cooperation 
and issued a mandate to the ASEAN permanent committees to give 
high priority to projects that would enhance trade liberalization 
and industrial complementation" (Palmer 1987: 45). At this 
meeting the ministers also agreed on a draft proposal for an 
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ASEAN Secretariat and a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation to be 
considered by their governments. 
Shortly thereafter the Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam 
Malik proposed a summit of governmental leaders be held. 
However, there was disagreement on how far economic cooperation 
should be taken at this time. Singapore had made tremendous 
economic strides and advocated increased economic cooperation and 
reduced tariffs barriers. However, Indonesia, still making the 
transformation from import substitution and heavily dependent on 
the export of raw materia~s, particularly petroleum was not 
enthusiastic about the idea. Though Singapore realized that they 
could not be the regional leader, Lee Kuan Yew used his position 
to keep ASEAN focused on achieving real progress in the area of 
economic cooperation (Palmer 1987: 46). As the organization 
became "a growing realty" the economic foreign ministers who had 
previously not been involved in the decision making process 
became an integral part of the pre-summit planning. (ASEAN 1978: 
81). 
The first Summit meeting of Heads of State was held in Bali, 
Indonesia, in February 1976. ASEAN in its own ten year history 
stated: "This historical event will prove to be an important 
turning point in the history of ASEAN, " .bring new hopes and 
brighter prospects for its future" (ASEAN 1978: 82). The Summit 
confirmed the commitment of the member nations to the original 
goals of ASEAN. To that end three documents were signed: the 
Declaration of ASEAN Concord, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
in Southeast Asia, and the Agreement on the Establishment of an 
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ASEAN Secretariat. The most important of these documents from an 
organizational view was the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. The 
treaty took the basic principles enunciated in the Bangkok 
declaration and expanded them to twenty articles (appendix 0). 
In addition this treaty established a dispute resolution 
mechanism. The key principle enunciated was: "mutual respect for 
the interdependence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity 
and national identity of all nations (appendix 0)." The Treaty 
also reiterated the ZOPFAN concept with the statement: "The right 
of every State to lead its national existence free from external 
interference, subversion or coercion" (appendix 0). 
The declaration of ASEAN concord was also a key affirmation 
to increase both political and economic cohesion. Yet, though 
the underlying reason for ASEAN's existence was security the only 
mention to that issue was that cooperation shoUld continue on "a 
non-ASEAN basis between the member states in security matters in 
accordance with their mutual needs and interests" (appendix E). 
This decision was made because they did not want to be viewed as 
a security alliance. This was in hopes of not antagonizing 
Indochina and leaving the door open for reconciliation between 
the Indochinese states and ASEAN. But even if reconCiliation was 
to have taken place the difference in both ideology and economic 
systems would have prevented the Indochinese states from becoming 
members. Furthermore, "Vietnam steadfastly refused to 
acknowledge ASEAN as a corporate entity." ... Also "at the time 
of the Bali summit, Vietnam's position was not only hostile but 
also alarming because of open support proffered to revolutionary 
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movements in the region" (Leifer 1989: 73). The summit also 
established the ASEAN Secretariat. However, the Secretariat 
itself was given limited power; and the Secretary general was not 
Secretary General of ASEAN but only of the ASEAN Secretariat. 
Still upon completion of the Bali conference ASEAN had 
finally transformed into international institution. The success 
of revolutionary communism in Indochina and the fear of same by 
the membership of ASEAN made the Bali summit possible. Yet, 
without the preceding years of development it is unlikely that an 
institution such as ASEAN and the level of cooperation attained 
by the non-communist members of their region could have been 
obtained. 
With renewed commitment to the principles of promoting 
economic cooperation the ASEAN economic ministers met in Kuala 
Lumpur in March of 1976. The economic ministers proposed setting 
up five economic committees under their control rather than the 
foreign ministers to further economic cooperation. "In fact the 
economic ministers proposed that they directly report to the 
heads of government rather than through Foreign Ministers" 
(Palmer 1987: 54). The economic ministers also established a 
group of experts to study the concept of industrial production 
"under ASEAN auspices: urea in Indonesia, urea in Malaysia, 
superphosphate in the Philippines, diesel engines in Singapore, 
and soda ash in Thailand" (ibid). The most significant proposal 
of this second meeting of economic ministers was the decision to 
establish procedures for dialogues with third countries. 
However, the proposal to have the economic ministers report 
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directly to heads of government was rejected at the ninth meeting 
of Foreign Ministers. The Foreign Ministers stated that they 
retained control of ASEAN policy and would conduct all external 
relations. 
Results in increased economic cooperation were forthcoming 
with next meeting of foreign ministers approving preferential 
trading agreements at a special meeting in February of 1977. The 
next summit of ASEAN heads of state was held at Kuala Lumpur in 
August 1977. The primary purpose of this meeting was to 
celebrate ASEAN's tenth anniversary. In comparison to the 1976 
Bali summit, this meeting produced less dramatic results. 
Organizational problems were resolved at this meeting, as the 
economic ministers received authority to report directly to the 
heads of government. But the heads of state reaffirmed the 
annual foreign minister meeting as the principal policy making 
organ of ASEAN. President Marcos dropped the Philippines claim 
to Sabah, removing an obstacle to further regional cooperation. 
The summit's most distinctive achievement was the 
international recognition that ASEAN received. The summit was 
attended by the Prime ministers of Australia, Japan and New 
Zealand. Attendance by other foreign heads of state added an 
aura of respectability to ASEAN it hitherto had not had. "Of 
special significance was the presence of Takeo Fukuda marking a 
major Japanese reappraisal of the importance and role of the 
association" (Leifer 1989: 81). Previously Japan had been 
skeptical about both the success and credentials of ASEAN and 
expressing concern in 1971 over the concept of ZOPFAN. But the 
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success of communism in Indochina caused Japan to rethink its 
views. Michael Leifer notes that "the presence of Malcom Fraser 
from Australia and Robert Muldoon from New Zealand was encouraged 
... by a concern not to make Mr Fukuda's visit the prime object 
of the post-summit occasion" (Leifer 1989: 82). The Summit also 
marked the formal establishment of dialogue partners. 
Even with the success of revolutionary communism in 
Indochina, the final communique made no mention of security 
concerns. Rather the communique expressed "the desire to develop 
peaceful and mutual beneficial relations with all countries in 
the region, including Kampuchea, Laos and Vietnam" (ASEAN 1978: 
195). The communique also expressed a desire to further the 
concept of ZOPFAN with the unification of Vietnam and the 
withdrawal of the U.S. ground combat forces from Indochina. 
In the first ten years of its existence ASEAN transformed 
from a desire to seek out a means for regional cooperation among 
the non-communist nations of the region to a recognized regional 
institution. Highlighting this transformation was the 
establishment of relations and dialogue by 1977 with the EEC, 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Japan, and the United States. 
Group participation in the United Nations had extended to the 
conference on Trade and Development and the United Nations 
Development Program. The first ten years also saw genuine 
strides towards ASEAN economic cooperation with the establishment 
of preferential trade agreements and a swap arrangement (swap is 
a standby credit agreement). 
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In summary, ASEAN had advanced from an embryonic concept 
with roots in ASA and Haphilindo into a viable regional 
organization with international recognition. However, it must be 
noted that even in 1977 the underlying reason for the 
association's existence was the security. By uniting under the 
banner of ASEAN the non-communist nations of Southeast Asia had 
pursued the concept a security alliance. The nations that 
comprised ASEAN knew that alone or collectively they could not 
defend against external aggressor. But by uniting under a common 
banner they effectively presented themselves as an organized 
collective force. International recognition of this collectivity 
was seen in the number of dialogue partners who began to consult 
with ASEAN as the regional representative of non-communist 
nations. 
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1977-1994 
CAMBODIA 
One effect of the Second Indochina War was to divide 
Southeast Asia into two ideological blocs, with Burma abstaining 
from either. But with the withdrawal of U.S. troops from 
Thailand in 1976, Vietnam began to reach out toward ASEAN. 
Following Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien's tour of the region, 
Hanoi established diplomatic relations with each of the ASEAN 
governments. Simultaneously, ASEAN also attempted to improve 
relations with Laos and Cambodia. ASEAN and particularly 
Thailand felt comfortable with Cambodia's taking a path 
independent from Vietnam and thus acting as a buffer between 
Vietnam and ASEAN. It seemed that the concept of ZOPFAN could 
possibly come to fulfillment and membership for the Indochinese 
states in ASEAN was openly discussed. 
This feeling of comfort proved to be short lived as tensions 
between Vietnam and Cambodia, and between Vietnam and China, 
escalated. Anxieties mounted further in November of 1978 
following Vietnam's signing of a treaty of friendship with the 
Soviet Union. Vietnam's decision to become a member of COMECON 
also caused concern in the ASEAN capitals. Vietnam's invasion of 
Cambodia shattered any hope of reconciliation with ASEAN; 
moreover, the Sino-Russian and Sino-Vietnam hostilities further 
exacerbated the situation. Consequently, China supported Pol Pot 
and the Khmer Rouge against the Vietnamese. Thus, the region's 
conflicts were again internationalized, and the region thrust 
onto the stage of great power competition. This sequence of 
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events greatly troubled ASEAN, as once again a common threat 
acted as a catalyst for greater cooperation. 
The invasion frightened the Thais into seeking quick 
improvement of relations with China. Secret negotiations with 
China in January of 1979 "paved the way for material provision 
for a Khmer Rouge insurgency and withdrawal of support for the 
Communist Party of Thailand" (Leifer 1989: 91). The other 
nations of ASEAN did not feel as threatened as Thailand, yet 
ASEAN's credibility would have been damaged or destroyed without 
a collective response to Vietnam's invasion. China's punitive 
attack across Vietnam's northern border widened the conflict and 
unnerved all the ASEAN members, as did the prospect of another 
huge wave of refugees from the fighting. This fear caused 
considerable alarm in the ASEAN capitals, which feared that a 
large refugee population would further exacerbate internal 
instability. 
On January 9, 1979, Indonesia's Foreign Minister and Chair 
of the ASEAN standing Committee issued a statement condemning the 
escalation and enlargement of the conflict between the two 
Indochina states. On January 12, a special meeting of the ASEAN 
Foreign Ministers convened in Bangkok, calling for the withdrawal 
of all foreign forces from Cambodia. The choice of Bangkok 
expressed solidarity with what had become ASEAN's front line 
state and marked a shift away from Jakarta as the focal point of 
ASEAN activity. In November 1979, ASEAN successfully sponsored a 
United Nations resolution calling for the withdrawal of 
Vietnamese troops for Cambodia. 
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ASEAN also insisted that the People's Republic of Cambodia 
under the leadership of Heng Samrin was illegitimate. Following 
the initial ASEAN response to the Vietnamese action, ASEAN 
effectively focused international attention on Cambodia by 
sponsoring resolutions at the United Nations and appealing to 
their dialogue partners. ASEAN argued that there was a linkage 
between the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Vietnam's actions 
in Cambodia. Additionally, ASEAN led the effort to prevent the 
Heng Samrin regime from taking Cambodia's seat at the United 
Nations, supporting instead the credentialing of a coalition of 
Cambodian resistance fighters. Although ASEAN stayed united 
diplomatically against Vietnam, there was concern in Kuala Lumpur 
and Jakarta about China's increasing regional influence. Thus, 
when China launched its punitive attack against Vietnam's 
northern border, ASEAN issued a statement calling for the 
withdrawal of all foreign forces from areas of conflict in 
Indochina. 
Another result of the Vietnamese action was to shift the 
focus of the ASEAN armed forces from internal security to 
external threats. The reason for this shift to external threats 
was the withdrawal of American forces from Indochina and the 
subsequent down sizing of the American military presence in 
Southeast Asia. The Soviet Navy also had started to make regular 
appearances in the region's waters and had signed access 
agreements with the Vietnamese. In response, cooperation between 
ASEAN states in the area of military cooperation increased 
dramatically. Military cooperation was not undertaken under the 
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auspices of ASEAN, but it did take place bilaterally because 
ASEAN did not want to be perceived as a security alliance (ASEAN 
as an entity has never held joint military operations). 
Additionally, Thailand's improving relations with China were not 
viewed enthusiastically by Indonesia or Malaysia. Instead, Kuala 
Lumpur and Jakarta considered China to be the long term threat to 
regional security. Nonetheless, ASEAN remained diplomatically 
united in seeking a solution to the Cambodian situation, 
collectively proposing numerous solutions. By utilizing 
international forums for their proposals, ASEAN was able to keep 
the Cambodian problem high on the political agenda in other 
capitals of the world. These collective efforts increased 
overall cooperation among the ASEAN states. 
The turning point in the Cambodian crisis stemmed from the 
changing aspects of the Cold War, and Vietnam's decision in 1986 
to purse Doi Moi or economic renovation. Hanoi knew that in 
order to improve its economic prospects Vietnam could not 
continue to support an expensive occupation force in Cambodia. 
Though by 1984 some troops had been withdrawn, Vietnam's 
leadership was also aware that in order to attract western 
support and investment they would have to resolve this crisis. 
The rise of Mikhael Gorbachev in the Soviet Union and the turmoil 
in the Eastern European communist nations also influenced 
Vietnam's leadership. Consequently, after a decade of 
occupation, Vietnam withdrew its remaining forces from Cambodia 
in September of 1989. 
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In this environment, peace talks began in Paris to resolve 
the Cambodia problem. An important preceding event to the Paris 
talks were the "cocktail parties" hosted by Jakarta in 1988 and 
1989. Therefore, the success of the Paris peace talks, 
sUbsequent elections, and the installation of a coalition 
government headed by Sihanouk in Phnom Penh can be considered a 
success for ASEAN. 
However, with the resolution of the Cambodian situation and 
the collapse of the Soviet Empire the principal threats to 
security and regional stability that united ASEAN dissipated, 
allowing other regional conflicts that were on the back banner to 
resurface. Examples of these include the territorial disputes 
over the Spratly Islands, which also involve China. Other 
maritime and territorial disputes throughout the region are also 
resurfacing. 
ECONOMIC COOPERATION 
Though ASEAN has existed as an entity since 1967, there was 
no serious effort at economic cooperation until the 1976 Bali 
summit. Combined with the summit of 1977, the proposed framework 
for economic cooperation seemed substantial (i.e., preferential 
trading agreement, industrial projects and a SWAP agreement). 
However, the reality of economic cooperation between the members 
of ASEAN has proved elusive. For example, only two of the five 
industrial cooperation projects approved by the ASEAN economic 
foreign ministers in 1976, were completed by 1988. One reason 
for the lack of success was Singapore's decision to drop the 
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diesel engine plant project after Indonesia's decision to 
undertake a similar non-ASEAN project of its own. This lack of 
progress in economic cooperation was evident at the third Summit 
of ASEAN leaders in 1987, (held to celebrate the twentieth 
anniversary of the Bangkok Declaration). At this Summit, a call 
for greater economic cooperation was again voiced and the 
agreement for joint industrial projects was revised. 
When considering economic cooperation among ASEAN states one 
must recognize that the size, level of industrialization, 
economic policies and links with the global economy differ for 
each ASEAN state. The two highest hurdles that ASEAN has yet to 
cross are the pre-existing economic ties with the rest of the 
world, mainly former colonial rulers and Japan. The second and 
highest hurdle, which may prove insurmountable, is the 
competitive rather than complementary nature of the ASEAN 
economies. All the nations of ASEAN (except Brunei) produce and 
export similar goods that are often in direct competition with 
each other in the global market. Even Singapore now faces 
increased competition from Malaysia and Thailand for 
technologically advanced manufactured goods. One of the most 
significant hindrances to increased economic cooperation are the 
domestic industries in each nation. Many of these industries 
enjoy government protection (and are often members of the 
governing elites themselves) and as such do not enthusiastically 
view increased economic cooperation or reduced tariff 
protection. Thus, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines 
continue to have high tariffs for many industries that would 
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fail if free trade and increased economic cooperation became a 
reality. 
Still differing levels of economic cooperation exist within 
ASEAN. The best example of intra-regional cooperation is between 
Singapore and the adjacent Malaysian provinces. Long term 
prospects for increased cooperation, however, remain elusive. 
Highlighting this fact is that Thailand is increasing economic 
cooperation with Laos at a much faster rate than with the ASEAN 
states. This level of cooperation should increase dramatically 
this year with the opening of the first bridge across the Mekong 
river linking the two nations. 
In summary, although the nations of ASEAN remain competitive 
rather then complementary, ASEAN has achieved economic success 
by negotiating as a regional bloc for reduced tariffs and 
favorable trade terms with the United States, Japan and the 
European Economic Community. 
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CONCLUSION 
Although composed of six quite dissimilar members ASEAN has 
survived in a highly volatile environment for a quarter of a 
century. This proven durability itself constitutes ASEAN's 
greatest achievement. Evolving from two failed attempts at a 
regional organization, ASEAN has become Southeast Asia's regional 
forum for both intra- and extra-regional issues. Yet, even after 
two decades ASEAN still does not constitute an international 
organization, regime or convention, but has metamorphically 
impersonated each. Rather, ASEAN has transformed itself over the 
last twenty-five years, taking the form of an organization, 
regime or convention as circumstances have required. With each 
successive crisis ASEAN has adapted its form to the prevailing 
environment. Yet upon resolution of the crisis ASEAN reverts to 
its original form - an agreement to disagree. 
ASEAN can best be described as a club, more specifically a 
club comprised of the elites from the member nations. Southeast 
Asian diplomats themselves use the club metaphor when describing 
ASEAN to outsiders. Examination of ASEAN's history highlights 
its shape-shifting abilities. For example, following the 
unification of Vietnam, at the Bali Summit, ASEAN assumed the 
form of a regional organization by establishing a Secretariat and 
setting down a dispute resolution mechanism. But previously, 
following the ZOPFAN declaration, ASEAN could best have been 
described as an embryonic regime that tried to establish the norm 
of great power non-interference in the region. Though it never 
came to fruition, ZOPFAN was an attempt by ASEAN to establish not 
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only an intra-regional regime, but an international regime by 
attempting to expanded membership to the world's great powers. 
Following the Summit of 1977, ASEAN's shape took the form of a 
convention, a loose organization with implicit rules as the ASEAN 
states attempted reconciliation with the Vietnam, Laos and 
Cambodia. ASEAN altered once again following Vietnam's 
occupation of Cambodia, assuming the shape of an international 
organization by strengthening its ability to respond 
collectively to events. This alteration permitted ASEAN to 
respond to the invasion with a unified front and to 
internationalize the conflict. There are other instances of this 
adapting form to the circumstances, but again ASEAN continually 
returns to its club-like form. 
Currently, ASEAN is in another transition period. Following 
its success in helping to resolve the Cambodian problem, the 
members of ASEAN no longer face a common threat. This lack of 
consensus within the institution was evident at the Fourth Summit 
of ASEAN Heads of State in 1992. Although Laos and Vietnam 
attained observer status, and China and Russia attended for the 
first time, internal drift was evident by the rejection of 
Singapore's proposal that an invitation to sign the Treaty of 
Amity and Concord be made to the five permanent members of the 
United Nations Security Council. Malaysia's proposal for an 
economic bloc with the Japanese was also rejected. The most 
significant of these two was the rejection of Singapore's 
proposal that theoretically would have furthered the goal of 
ZOPFAN. Furthermore, in response to the formation of free trade 
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zones in Europe and North America, ASEAN approved an ASEAN Free 
Trade Zone to be implemented by 2008 at the 1992 Summit. But as 
of 1994 no concrete steps toward implementation have been 
undertaken. This is because as noted above the ASEAN members are 
economic competitors and subsequently ill-suited for economic 
integration. Similarly, at the Foreign Ministers meeting in 1992 
a call was made for ASEAN, China, and Vietnam to negotiate 
peacefully on issues of sovereignty and economic exploitation in 
the South China Sea, but no headway was made toward settlement of 
conflicting claims among the members themselves. Notably, at 
this meeting China and Vietnam signed onto an ASEAN proposal for 
joint development (Barnett 1993: 47). Therefore at this juncture 
ASEAN may be transforming into a convention once again. 
Thus, ASEAN has evolved as an institution whose ability to 
take on various forms has served the interests of its members 
extremely well for the last twenty-five years. Yet, ASEAN as an 
institution can be viewed as either a success or a failure. If 
one bases evaluations on the Bangkok Declaration and its emphasis 
on economic cooperation, then ASEAN has not achieved success. 
The success of ASEAN lies in its aforementioned ability to 
transform itself in response to changing regional circumstances. 
Yet, what explains this ability to survive twenty years of 
existence? If ASEAN has at one time or another constituted a 
regime, does regime theory have value when examining ASEAN? 
These questions are even more interesting when one considers the 
numerous other attempts at regional cooperation around the globe 
that have failed. 
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REGIME THEORY 
Still, labeling ASEAN proves elusive. On close examination 
what one finds is a web of interconnected relationships among the 
member nations that constitute a hybrid of Keohane's three types 
of institutions: "International institutions include formal 
intergovernmental or transnational organizations, international 
regimes, and conventions." (Rittberger 1993: 28). But, what 
explains ASEAN's success? I argue that international regime 
theories provide valuable insight into understanding how ASEAN 
has managed not only to survive, but flourish. 
Regime formation theories attempt to understand the process 
by which effective regimes are created. By extension they 
provide valuable insight into regime preservation and 
maintenance. Further, if regime formation theories make 
plausible assumptions about regime creation, it follows that if 
these factors decay a regime may collapse, although the point at 
which a regime begins to decay and collapse is a topic of 
scholarly debate. For the purposes of this paper, I will extend 
the basic tenets of the regime formation theories contained in 
appendix B to cover formation, maintenance, and decay. The 
following section will examine point by point the theories 
covered in appendix B and the explanations they might provide for 
ASEAN's success. 
The first and most widely debated group of regime formation 
theories are power based. As previously discussed the most 
popular of this group emphasizes the role of hegemony. But as 
discussed above, no global hegemon (i.e., the U.S., or the Soviet 
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Union) was involved in the creation of ASEAN. As such the 
hegemonic hypotheses is not applicable to ASEAN's case. Other 
power based theories also fail to explain ASEAN. However, in 
Southeast Asia itself, Indonesia could be considered the regional 
hegemon. The relevance here is that previous attempts at intra-
regional cooperation failed until Indonesia under Sukarno decided 
to support the concept of ASEAN. Still, in the strictest sense, 
the power based theories offer little in the way of explaining 
ASEAN's creation or success. 
The next subset of theories is the interest based 
hypotheses. The concepts contained in these theories do provide 
valuable insight in attempting to understand why ASEAN has 
thrived. Scrutiny of the motives behind the first ten years of 
ASEAN's existence clearly are articulated by the basic premise of 
the interest based theories: "Social institutions, including 
international regimes arise from the interaction of self-
interested parties endeavoring to coordinate their behavior to 
reap joint gains that may but need not take the form of public 
goods (Appendix B)." Young has separated the interest based 
hypotheses into ten variables that may explain successful regime 
formation. 
Five of these ten variables considered necessary for 
effective regime formation by the interest based hypotheses apply 
at one period or another to ASEAN, the relevance of two other 
variables is debatable (see appendix B for further discussion of 
each point): 
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1. Integrative bargaining and a veil of uncertainty. 
A veil of uncertainty has surrounded events in the entire region 
since the end of World War II. Thus a veil of uncertainty has 
affected each of the founding members of ASEAN throughout their 
histories. The most significant uncertainty for the founding 
members of ASEAN in 1967 was internal security. Additionally, 
the continued uncertainty of events in Indochina contributed to 
ASEAN's continued cooperation. Arguably these two factors have 
been important in holding ASEAN together. 
2. Equity. "The availability of institutional options that all 
participants can accept as equitable (rather than efficient) is 
necessary" for regime formation has not been a major factor for 
ASEAN. Though it should be noted that the chair of the ASEAN 
standing committee is rotated annually, which may not be 
efficient, but can be considered equitable. 
3. Salient solutions. For its members ASEAN has provided 
solutions to regional concerns. Examples include the unified 
front ASEAN takes when dealing with extra-regional entities, 
particularly in the area of trade. 
4. Exogenous shocks or crises. This tenet of the interest based 
hypotheses refers to the catalyst of each successive step towards 
greater cooperation within ASEAN. Arguably without the common 
crises faced by the ASEAN membership the association might have 
ceased to exist. Responding to shocks has also been the cause 
for ASEAN's frequent transformations. 
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5. Policy priority. The literature contains two divergent 
views: ·Success in regime formation can occur only when the issue 
at stake achieves high-priority status ...• ·Alternatively, it is 
easier to from a regime when the subject matter is not high on 
the political agendas of the parties.· ASEAN in its twenty-five 
year history has shown both views to be valid. ASEAN has 
effectively acted when a crisis has threatened the member nations 
and resolving or mediating the threat has been high on the 
political agenda. Yet, when there are no common threats ASEAN's 
reversion to club status has helped it to remain viable. 
6. Common good. ·A willingness to set aside narrow national 
interests in favor of some broader conception of the common good 
is necessary to achieve success in regime formation.· This may 
have been the case in response to the Cambodian invasion. 
However, this easily could have been an anomaly, because the 
members of ASEAN jealously guard their sovereignty, and it is 
doubtful that the member nations would have come to Thailand's 
aid if invaded by Vietnam. This was evident in the Thai decision 
to reach out to China and Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur's wariness of 
this move. Thus it is arguable that the association's members 
will not set aside ·narrow national interests in favor of the 
common good.· As such this aspect of the interest based 
hypotheses may have no value when examining ASEAN. 
7. Science and technology. Not relevant to ASEAN's formation or 
continued survival. 
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8. Relevant parties. The second Indochina war broke Southeast 
Asia into ideological blocs, communist versus anti-communist, 
with ASEAN comprising the regions anti-communist bloc. Yet this 
mayor may not be relevant to ASEAN's success in that some extra-
regional powers (i.e., the U.S.) could also be considered 
relevant parties in the fight against communism. 
9. Compliance mechanisms. ASEAN has yet to establish any type of 
compliance mechanisms. 
10. Individuals as leaders. The leadership of ASEAN from its 
formation until the present has remained remarkably stable. 
Further, politics in each nation are dominated by a national 
elite who's perception of both regional and extra-regional events 
more closely match the elites of other nations rather than their 
own countrymen. This factor may be the single greatest 
contributor to ASEAN's survival. However, as the older 
generation passes the reins of power and democracy takes a firmer 
hold in the region, it is uncertain that the new elites will 
remain as committed as their predecessors have been to ASEAN. 
The knowledge-based hypotheses about epistemic communities 
and cognitive factors lacked explanatory power in 1967. But, in 
attempting to understand the longevity of ASEAN, these factors 
take on greater significance. One result of the last twenty-five 
years is the matrices of regular and frequent consultation among 
governmental elites of the member nations. This has established 
personnel contacts and relationships at numerous levels which are 
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now expanding to the private sector. In addition a common ASEAN 
jargon and ASEAN community also has developed. Though hard to 
examine these shared values and learning experiences may 
translate into the strongest of all the factors that bind ASEAN 
together. 
Returning to the original question of whether international 
regime theories have value when examining regime formation among 
small to mid-range powers, the answers is yes. Although 
classifying ASEAN has proved elusive, regime theories explain the 
forces behind the success of ASEAN over the last twenty-five 
years. Of the three main classifications of regime formation 
hypotheses the two with the greatest value are the interest based 
and knowledge based. However, the power based theories could 
have some significance if one considers Indonesia to have played 
the role of a regional hegemon in ASEAN's formation and continued 
success. 
In conclusion, as the world seeks to foster greater 
cooperation, there are important lessons to be drawn from ASEAN's 
experience. In the area of regime formation and increased 
international cooperation the concepts proposed by the interest 
based hypotheses seem the most relevant. For ASEAN leadership, a 
veil of uncertainty and exogenous shocks or crises were the most 
important factors. However, explanations for the survival of an 
international institution seem to be contained in the knowledge 
based approach. The cognitive concept that shared contacts and 
learning experiences lead to effective regime formation may 
contain the answer for long term institutional survival. These 
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cognitive factors have definitely influenced ASEAN and 
contributed to its success. Quite simply they they have become 
the glue that binds ASEAN together when it reverts to its club-
like status and maintains the commitment to cooperate even when 
internal drift is high. But the most important lesson to be 
learned from ASEAN may be contained in the words of Malaysia's 
Foreign Minister "Make Haste Slowly." 
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Appendix A 
Five questions that should be asked of every regime. 
1. Institutional Character. What are the principal rights, 
rUles, and social choice procedures of the regime? How do they 
structure the behavior of individuals actors to produce a stream 
of collective outcomes? 
2. Jurisdictional boundaries. What is the coverage of the 
regime in terms of functional scope, areal domain, and 
membership? Is this coverage appropriate under prevailing 
conditions? 
3. Conditions tor operation. What conditions are necessary for 
the regime to work at all? Under what conditions will the 
operation of the regime yield particularly desirable results (for 
example, economic efficiency, distributive justice, ecological 
balance)? 
4. Consequences of operation. What sorts of outcomes (either 
individual or collective) can the regime be expected to produce? 
What are the appropriate criteria for evaluating these outcomes? 
5. Regime dynamics. How did the regime come into existence, and 
what is the likelihood that it will experience changes in the 
foreseeable future? Does the regime include transformation rules 
that are likely to be effective? 
(Young 1989: 29) 
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Appendix B 
Template ot Hypotheses to Be Tested 
A. Power-based hypotheses  
Basic Premise: Institutions, including international regimes,  
are structured by and reflect the distribution and configuration  
of power in international society.  
1. Hegemony. The most widely discussed hypothesis in this set,  
which arises from hegemonic stability theory, states that the  
presence of a hegemon (that is, an actor possessing a  
preponderance of material resources) is a necessary condition for  
regime formation in international society.  
a. Benign hegemony: the hegemon, functioning as the 
dominant member of a privileged group, supplies institutional 
arrangements to others as public goods. 
b. Coercive hegemony: the hegemon exercises 
structural power to impose institutional arrangements favorable 
to itself, regardless of the consequences for others. 
2. Other power-based hypotheses are possible. Here are some 
examples to consider. 
a. A bipolar or bimodal distribution of power (produ~ing a 
balance of power) is necessary for success in regime formation. 
b. The greater the degree of symmetry in the distribution 
of power, the more likely efforts to create regimes are to 
succeed. 
c. The existence of a small group of great powers in a 
given issue area (that is, a directorate) enhances prospects for 
regime formation. 
B. Interest-based hypotheses 
Basic Premise: Social institutions, including international 
regimes arise from the interaction of self-interested parties 
endeavoring to coordinate their behavior to reap joint gains that 
may but need not take the form of public goods. It follows that 
the availability of joint gains or, in other words, a contract 
zone or zone of agreements constitutes a necessary (though not 
sufficient) condition for the formation of international regimes. 
There is, however, no need to assume that the parties possess 
full or complete information regarding the extent or precise 
nature of the feasible or joint gains at the outset. (In some 
situations parties dispute or disagree regarding the existence or 
scope of joint gains.) Efforts to construct theories about the 
resilient interactions address the following question: Why do 
actors in international society succeed in forming international 
regimes to reap feasible gains in some cases but not in others? 
The processes leading to success or failure are ordinarily 
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conceptualized as bargaining or negotiation; the hypotheses of 
interest to us identify determinants of success or failure in the 
resultant institutional bargaining. 
1. Integrative bargaining and a veil of uncertainty. 
Institutional bargaining can succeed only when the prominence of 
integrative bargaining and/or the presence of a veil of 
uncertainty make it easy for the partners to approach the problem 
under consideration in contractarian terms. 
2. Equity. The availability of institutional options 
that all participants can accept as equitable (rather than 
efficient) is necessary for institutional bargaining to succeed. 
3. Salient solutions. The existence of a salient solution 
(or focal point describable in simple terms) increases the 
probability of success in institutional bargaining. 
4. Exogenous shocks or crises. Shocks or crises 
occurring outside of the bargaining process increase the 
probability of success in efforts to negotiate the terms of 
international regimes. 
5. Policy priority. (a) Success in regime formation 
can occur only when the issue at stake achieves high-priority 
status on the policy agenda of each of the participants. (b) 
Alternatively, it is easier to from a regime when the subject 
matter is not high on the political agendas of the parties. 
6. Common good. A willingness to set aside narrow 
national interests in favor of some broader conception of the 
common good is necessary to achieve success in regime formation. 
7. Science and technology. (a) The greater the tendency 
for parties to concentrate on scientific or technical 
considerations as opposed to political issues, the greater the 
likelihood of successful regime formation. (b) The greater the 
role of negotiators with scientific or technical competence 
in relation to those with political credentials, the greater the 
likelihood for successful regime formation. (c) It is easier to 
form a regime when the issues at state are highly technical. 
8. Relevant parties. All parties with an interest in 
the problem must participate in the negations for regime 
formation to succeed. 
9. Compliance mechanisms. The probability for success 
in institutional bargaining rises when compliance mechanisms that 
the parties regard as clear-cut and effective are available. 
10. Individuals as leaders. Institutional bargaining 
is likely to succeed when individual leadership emerges; it will 
fail in the absence of such leadership. 
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C. Knowledge-based hypotheses 
Basic Premise: Shared perceptions, beliefs, and understandings 
of causal mechanisms among the relevant parties as well as 
identifiable communities, including epistemic communities and 
advocacy organizations, that arise to propagate this knowledge 
are important determinants of regime formation. Some would argue 
that cognitive considerations - including ideas, values and 
learning shared through transnational alliances, nongovernmental 
organizations, and groups of experts - constitute a more 
significant factor in regime formation than power or the 
interests of states. Two alternative accounts of how cognitive 
concerns influence regime formation are identifiable in the 
literature. 
1. Scientific convergence. Agreement or consensus 
within the scientific community regarding causal relations and 
appropriate responses is a prerequisite for regime formation. 
(Values are less important, though not irrelevant, to this 
hypotheses than to the next hypothesis. ) 
2. Epistemic communities. A group of individuals (whose 
membership usually transcends national boundaries and includes 
both scientists or experts and policy makers) who share a common 
view regarding causal mechanisms and appropriate responses and 
who have a common set of values emerges in conjunction with the 
issue in question. For a regime to form some mechanism (possibly 
an international organization but in some cases a less formal 
network) arises to link the members of this group. The resulting 
epistemic community is able not only to promote its own preferred 
arrangements but also prevent opposing views and values from 
becoming influential or dominant at the domestic level in each of 
the relevant states. 
D. Contextual factors 
National and world circumstances and events seemingly unrelated 
to the issue area under consideration play a major role in 
determining if and when international cooperation to address a 
particular problem or issue area occurs and in shaping the 
content of any regime that forms. 
(Young and Osherenko 1993: 263-266) 
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Appendix C 
The ASEAN Declaration 
(The Bangkok Declaration) 
The Presidium Minister for Political Affairs/Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, the Deputy Prime Minister of 
Malaysia, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Singapore and the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of Thailand: 
MINDFUL of the existence of mutual interest and common 
problems among countries of South-East Asia and convinced of the 
need to strengthen further the existing bonds of regional 
solidarity and cooperation, 
DESIRING to establish a firm foundation for common action to 
promote regional cooperation in South-East Asia in the spirt of 
equality and partnership and thereby contribute towards peace, 
progress and prosperity in the region, 
CONSCIOUS that in an increasingly interdependent world, the 
cherished ideals of peace, freedom, social justice and economic 
well-being are best maintained by fostering good understanding, 
good neighborliness and meaningful cooperation among the 
countries of the region already bound together by ties of history 
and culture. 
CONSIDERING that the countries of South-East Asia share a 
primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social 
stability of the region and ensuring their peaceful and 
progressive national development, and that they are determined to 
ensure their stability and security from external interference in 
any form as manifestation in order to preserve their national 
identities in accordance with the ideals and aspiration of their 
peoples, 
AFFIRMING that all foreign bases are temporary and remain 
only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned 
and are not intended to be used directly or indirectly to subvert 
the national independence and freedom of States in the area or 
prejudice the orderly processes of their national development, 
DO HEREBY DECLARE: 
FIRST, the establishment of an Association for Regional 
Cooperation among the countries of South-East Asia to be known as 
the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
Second, that the aims and purposes of the Association shall 
be: 
1. To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and 
cultural development in the region through joint endeavors in the 
spirt of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the 
foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of South-East 
Asian Nations, 
2. To promote regional peace and stability through abiding 
respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among 
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countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the 
United Nations Charter, 
3. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on 
matters of common interest in the economic, social, cultural, 
technical, scientific and administrative fields; 
4. To provide assistance to each other in the form of training 
and research facilities in the educational, professional, 
technical and administrative spheres; 
5. To collaborate more effectively for greater utilization of 
their agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade, 
including the study of the problems of international commodity 
trade, the improvement of their transportation and communication 
facilities and the raising of living standards of their peoples; 
6. To promote South-East Asian studies; 
7. To maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing 
international and regional organization with similar aims and 
purposes, and explore all avenues for even closer cooperation 
among themselves. 
THIRD, that, to carry out these aims and purposes, the 
following machinery shall be established, 
(a). Annual Meeting of Foreign Ministers, which shall be by 
rotation and referred to as ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Special 
Meetings of Foreign Ministers may be convened as required, 
(b). A standing Committee, under the chairmanship of the Foreign 
Minister of the host country or his representative and having as 
its membership the accredited Ambassadors of the other member 
countries, to carry out on the work of the Association in between 
Meetings of Foreign Ministers; 
(c). Ad-Hoc Committees and Permanent Committees of specialists 
and officials on specific subjects, 
(d). A national Secretariat in each member country to carry out 
the work of the Association on behalf of that country and to 
service the Annual or Special Meetings of Foreign Ministers, the 
Standing Committee and such other Committee as may hereafter be 
established. 
FOURTH, that the Association is open tor participation to 
all States in the South-East Asian Region subscribing to the 
aforementioned aims, principles and purposes. 
FIFTH, that the Association represents the collective will 
of the nations of South-East Asia to bind themselves together in 
friendship and cooperation and, through joint efforts and 
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sacrifices, secure for their people and for posterity the 
blessings of peace, freedom and prosperity. 
Done in Bangkok on the Eight Day of August in the Year One 
Thousand Nine Hundred and Sixty-Seven. 
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Appendix D 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia 
PREAMBLE 
The High Contracting Parties; 
CONSCIOUS of the existing ties of history, geography and 
culture, which have bound their people together; 
ANXIOUS to promote regional peace and stability, friendship 
and mutual cooperation on matters affecting Southeast Asia 
consistent with the spirt and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations, the Ten Principles adopted by the Asian-African 
Conference in Bandung on 25 April 1955, the Declaration of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations signed in Bangkok on 8 
August 1967, and the Declaration signed in Kuala Lumpur on 27 
November 1971; 
CONVINCED that the settlement of differences or disputes 
between their countries should be regulated by rational, 
effective and sufficiently flexible procedures, avoiding negative 
attitude which might endanger or hinder cooperation; 
BELIEVING in the need for cooperation with all peace -
loving nations, both within and outside Southeast Asia, in the 
furtherance of world peace, stability and harmony; 
SOLEMNLY AGREE to enter into a Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation as follows: 
CHAPTER I 
PURPOSE AND PRINCIPLES 
Article 1 
The purpose of this treaty is to promote perpetual peace, 
everlasting amity and cooperation among their peoples which would 
contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer relationship. 
Article 2 
In their relations with one another, the High Contracting 
Parties shall be gUided by the following principles: 
a. Mutual respect for the interdependence, sovereignty, 
equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all 
nations; 
b. 
exis
coercion; 
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c. Non-interference in the internal affairs of one 
another; 
d. Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful 
means; 
e. Renunciation of the threat or use of force; 
f. Effective cooperation among themselves. 
CHAPTER II  
AMITY  
Article 3  
In pursuance of the purpose of this treaty the High 
contracting Parties shall endeavor to develop and strengthen the 
traditional, cultural and historical ties of friendship, good 
neighborliness and cooperation which bind them together and shall 
fUlfil in good faith and obligations assumed under this Treaty. 
In order to promote closer understanding among them, the High 
Contracting parties shall encourage and facilitate contact and 
intercourse among their peoples. 
CHAPTER III  
COOPERATION  
Article 4  
The High Contracting Parties shall promote active 
cooperation in the economic, social, technical, scientific and 
administrative fields as well as in matters of common ideals and 
aspiration of international peace and stability in the region and 
all other matters of common interest. 
Article 5 
Pursuant to Article 4 the High Contracting Parities shall 
exert their maximum eftorts multilaterally as well as bilaterally 
on the basis of equality, non-discrimination and mutual benefit. 
Article 6 
The High ContractIng Parties shall collaborate for the 
acceleration of the economic growth in the region in order to 
strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community 
of nations in Southeast Asia. To this end, they shall promote 
the greater utilization of their agriculture and industries, the 
expansion of their trade and the improvement of their economic 
infra-structure for the mutual benefit ot their peoples. In this 
regard, they shall continue to explore all avenues for close and 
beneficial cooperation with other States as well as international 
and regional orgainisations [SIC] outside the region. 
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Article 7 
The High Contracting Parties, in order to achieve social 
justice and to raise the standards of living of the peoples of 
the region, shall intensify economic cooperation. For this 
purpose, they shall adopt appropriate regional strategies for 
economic development and mutual assistance. 
Article 8 
The High Contracting Parties shall strive to achieve the 
closest cooperation on the widest scale and shall seek to provide 
assistance to one another in the form of training and research 
facilities in the social, cUltural, technical, scientific and 
administrative fields. 
Article 9 
The High Contracting Parities shall endeavor to foster 
cooperation in the furtherance of the cause of peace, harmony and 
stability in the region. To this end, the High Contracting 
Parties shall maintain regular contacts and consultations with 
one another on international and regional matters with a view to 
coordinating their views, actions and policies. 
Article 10 
Each High Contracting Party shall not in any manner or form 
participate in any activity which shall constitute a threat to 
the political and economic stability, sovereignty, or territorial 
integrity of another High Contracting Party. 
Article 11 
The High Contracting Parties shall endeavor to strengthen 
their respective national resilience in their political, 
economic, socio-cultural as well as security fields in conformity 
with their respective ideals and aspirations, free from external 
interference as well as internal subversive activities in order 
to preserve their respective national identities. 
Article 12 
The High Contracting Parties in their efforts to achieve 
regional prosperity and security, shall endeavor to cooperate in 
all the fields for the promotion of regional resilience, based on 
the principles of self-confidence, self-reliance, mutual respect, 
cooperation and solidarity which will constitute the foundation 
for a strong and viable community of nations in Southeast Asia. 
CHAPTER IV  
PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES  
Article 13  
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The High Contracting Parties shall have the determination 
and good faith to prevent disputes from arising. In case 
disputes on matters directly affecting them shall refrain from 
the threat or use of force and shall at all times settle such 
disputes among themselves through friendly negotiations. 
Article 14 
To settle disputes through regional processes, the High 
Contracting Parties shall constitute, as a continuing body, a 
High Council comprising a Representative at Ministerial level 
from each of the High Contracting Parties to take cognizance of 
the existence of disputes or situations likely to disturb 
regional peace and harmony. 
Article 15 
In the event no solution is reached through direct 
negotiation, the High Council shall take cognizance of the 
dispute or the situation and shall recommend to the parities in 
dispute appropriate means of settlement such as good offices, 
mediation, inquiry or conciliation. The High Council may however 
offer its good offices, or upon agreement of the parties in 
dispute, constitute itself into a committee of mediation, inquiry 
or conciliation. When deemed necessary, the High Council shall 
recommended appropriate measure for the prevention of a 
deterioration of the dispute or the situation. 
Article 16 
The foregoing provision of this Chapter shall not apply to 
dispute unless all the parties to the dispute agree to their 
application to that dispute. However, this shall not preclude 
the other High Contracting Parties not party to the dispute from 
offering all possible assistance to settle the said dispute. 
Parties to the dispute should be well disposed towards such 
offers of assistance. 
Article 17 
Nothing in the Treaty shall preclude recourse to the modes 
of peaceful settlement contained in Article 33 (1) of the Charter 
of the United Nations. The High Contracting Parties which are 
parties to a dispute should be encouraged to take initiatives to 
solve it by friendly negotiations before resorting to the other 
procedures provided for in the Charter of the United Nations. 
CHAPTER V 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Article 18 
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This treaty shall be signed by the Republic of Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of 
Singapore and the Kingdom of Thailand. It shall be ratified in 
accordance with the constitutional procedures of each signatory 
State. 
Article 19 
This treaty shall enter into force on this date of the 
deposit of the fifth instrument of ratification with the 
Governments of the signatory States which are designated 
Depositories of this Treaty and of the instruments of 
ratification or accession. 
Article 20 
This Treaty is drawn up in the official languages of the 
High Contracting Parties, all of which are equally authoritative. 
There shall be an agreed common translation of the texts in the 
English language. Any divergent interpretation of the common 
text shall be settled by negotiation. 
IN FAITH THEREOF the High Contracting Parties have signed 
the Treaty and have hereto affixed their Seals. 
Done at Denpasar, Bali, this twenty-fourth day of February 
in the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy-six. 
(signatories for each nation are as follows,) 
Soeharto, President of Indonesia 
Datuk Hussein onn, Prime Minister of Malaysia 
Ferdinand Marcos, President of the Philippines 
Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore 
Kukrit Pramoj, Prime Minister of Thailand 
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Appendix E 
DECLARATION OF ASEAN CONCORD  
A COMMON BOND EXISTING AMONG THE MEMBER STATES OF THE ASSOCIATION  
OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS,  
The President of the Republic of Indonesia, the Prime 
Minister ot Malaysia, the President ot the Republic of the 
Philippines, the Prime minister of the Republic of Singapore and 
the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand, 
REAFFIRM their commitment to the Declaration of Bandung, 
Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur, and the Charter of the United Nations; 
ENDEAVOR to promote peace, progress, prosperity and the 
welfare of the peoples of member states, 
UNDERTAKE to consolidate the Achievements of ASEAN and 
expand ASEAN cooperation in the economic, social, cultural and 
political fields; 
DO HEREBY DECLARE. 
ASEAN cooperation shall take into account, among others, the 
following objectives and principles in the pursuit of political 
stability • 
1. The stability of each member state and of the ASEAN region 
is an essential contribution to international peace and security. 
Each member state resolves to eliminate threats posed by 
subversion to its stability, thus strengthening national and 
ASEAN resilience. 
2. Member states, individually and collectively, shall take 
active steps for the early establishment of the Zone of Peace, 
Freedom and Neutrality. 
3. The elimination of poverty, hunger, disease and illiteracy 
is a primary concern of member states. They shall therefore 
intensify cooperation in economic and social development, with 
particular emphasis on the promotion of social justice and on the 
improvement ot the living standards of their peoples. 
4. Natural disasters and other major calamities can retard the 
pace of development of member states. They shall extend, within 
their capabilities, assistance for relief of member states in 
distress 
5. Member states shall take cooperative action in their national 
and regional development programmes, utilizing as far as possible 
the resources available in the ASEAN region to broaden the 
complementarity of their respective economies. 
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6. Member states, in the spirt of ASEAN solidarity, shall rely 
exclusively on peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-
regional differences. 
7. Member states shall strive, individually and collectively, to 
create conditions conducive to the promotion of peaceful 
cooperation among the nations of Southeast Asia on the basis of 
mutual respect and mutual benefit. 
8. Member states shall vigorously develop an awareness of 
regional identity and exert all efforts to create a strong ASEAN 
community, respected by all and respecting all nations on the 
basis of mutually advantageous relationships, and in accordance 
with the principles of self-determination, sovereign equality and 
non-interference in the internal affairs of nations. 
AND DO HEREBY ADOPT 
The following programme of action as a framework for ASEAN 
cooperation: 
A. POLITICAL 
1. Meetings of the Heads of Government of the member states 
as and when necessary. 
2. Signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 
Southeast Asia. 
3. Settlement of intra-regional disputes by peaceful means 
as soon as possible. 
4. Immediate consideration of initial steps towards 
recognition of and respect for the Zone of Peace, Freedom and 
neutrality wherever possible. 
5. Improvement of ASEAN machinery to strengthen political 
cooperation. 
6. Study on how to develop judicial cooperation including 
the possibility of an ASEAN Extradition Treaty; 
7. Strengthening of political solidarity by promoting the 
harmonization of views, coordinating position and, where possible 
and desirable, taking common actions. 
B. ECONOMIC 
1. Cooperation on Basic Commodities, particularly Food 
and Energy 
(il Member states shall assist each other by according 
priority to the supply of the individual country's needs in 
critical circumstance, and priority to the acquisition of 
exports from members states, in respect of basic 
commodities, particularly food and energy. 
(ii) Member states shall also intensify cooperation in 
the production of basic commodities particularly food and 
energy in the individual member states of the region. 
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2. Industrial Cooperation 
(i) Member states shall cooperate to establish large-scale 
ASEAN industrial plants, particularly to meet regional 
requirements of essential commodities. 
(ii) Priority shall be given to projects which utilize 
the available materials in the members states, contribute to 
the increase of food production, increase foreign exchange 
earnings or save foreign exchange and create employment. 
3. Cooperation in Trade 
(i) Member states shall cooperate in the fields of trade in 
order to promote development and growth of new production 
and trade to improve the trade structures of individual 
states and among the countries of ASEAN conducive to further 
development and to safeguard and increase their foreign 
exchange earnings and reserves. 
(ii) Member states shall progress towards the establishment 
of preferential trading arrangements as a long term 
objective on a basis deemed to be at any particular time 
appropriate through rounds of negotiations subject to the 
unanimous agreement of member states. 
(iii) The expansion of trade among member states shall be 
facilitated through cooperation on basic commodities, 
particularly in food and energy and through cooperation in 
ASEAN industrial projects. 
(iv) Members states shall accelerate joint efforts to 
improve access to markets outside ASEAN for their raw 
material and finished products by seeking the elimination of 
all trade barriers in those markets, developing new usage 
for these products and in adopting common approaches and 
actions in dealing with regional groupings and individual 
economic powers. 
(v) Such efforts shall also lead to cooperation in the 
filed of technology and production methods in order to 
increase the production and to improve the quality of 
export products, as well as to develop new export 
products with a view to diversifying exports. 
4. Joint Approach to International Commodity Problems 
and Other World Economic Problems 
(i) The principle of ASEAN cooperation on trade shall 
also be reflected on a priority basis in joint approaches 
to international commodity problems and other world 
economic problems such as the reform of international 
trading systems, the reform of international monetary system 
and transfer of real resources, in the United Nations and 
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other relevant multilateral tora, with a view to 
contributing to the establishment of the New International 
Economic Order. 
(ii) Member states shall give priority to the 
stabilisation (SIC) and increase of export earnings of 
those commodities produced and exported by them through 
commodity agreements including buffer stock schemes and 
other means. 
5. Machinery for Economic Cooperation  
Ministerial meetings on economic matters shall be  
held regularly or as deemed necessary in order to:  
(i) formulate recommendations for the consideration of 
Governments of members states for the strengthening of ASEAN 
economic cooperation; 
(ii) Review the coordination and implementation of 
agreed ASEAN programmes and projects on economic 
cooperation; 
(iii) exchange views and consult on national  
development plans and policies as a step towards  
harmonizing regional development; and  
(iv) perform such other relevant functions as agreed" upon 
by the member governments. 
c. Social 
1. Cooperation in the field of social development, with 
emphasis on the well being of low-income group and of rural 
population, through the expansion of opportunities for productive 
employment with fair remuneration. 
2. Support for the active involvement of all sectors and levels 
of the ASEAN communities, particularly the women and youth, in 
development efforts. 
3. Intensification and expansion of existing cooperation in 
meeting the problems of population growth in the ASEAN region, 
and where possible, formulation of new strategies in 
collaboration with appropriate international agencies. 
4. Intensification of cooperation among member states as well as 
with the relevant international bodies in the prevention and 
eradication of the abuse of narcotics and the illegal trafficking 
of drugs. 
d. Cultural and Information 
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1. Introduction of the study of ASEAN, its members states and 
their national languages as part of the curricula of schools and 
other institutions of learning in the members states. 
2. Support of ASEAN scholars, writers, artists and mass media 
representatives to enable them to play an active role in 
fostering a sense of regional identity and fellowship 
3. Promotion of Southeast Asian studies through closer 
collaboration among national institutes. 
E. Security 
Continuation of cooperation on a non-ASEAN basis between the 
member states in security matters in accordance with their mutual 
needs and interests. 
f. Improvement of ASEAN machinery 
1. Signing of the Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN 
Secretariat. 
2. Regular review of the ASEAN organizational structure with a 
view to improving its effectiveness. 
3. Study of the desirability of a new constitutional framework 
for ASEAN 
DONE at Denpasar, Bali, this twenty-fourth day of February in the  
year one thousand nine hundred and seventy-six.  
(signatories for each nation are as follows:)  
Soeharto, President of Indonesia  
Datuk Hussein Onn, Prime Minister of Malaysia  
Ferdinand Marcos, President of the Philippines  
Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore  
Kukrit Pramoj, Prime Minister of Thailand  
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Appendix F 
Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration 
We the foreign Ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore and the Special Envoy of the National Executive Council 
of Thailand: 
Firmly believing in the merits of regional co-operation 
which has drawn our countries to co-operate together in economic, 
social and cultural fields in the Association of South East Asian 
Nations; 
Desirous of bringing about a relaxation of international 
tension and of achieving a lasting peace in South East Asia; 
Inspired by the worthy aims and objectives of the United 
Nations, in particular by the principles of respect for the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, abstention 
from threat or use of force, peaceful settlement of international 
disputes, equal rights and self-determination and non-
interference in the affairs of States; 
Believing in the continuing validity of the declaration on 
the Promotion of World Peace and Co-operation of the Bandung 
conference of 1955 which, among others, enunciates the principles 
by which states may coexist peacefully; 
Recognizing the right of every state, large or small, to 
lead its national existence free from outside interference in its 
internal affairs as this interference will adversely affects its 
freedom, independence and integrity; 
Dedicated to the maintenance of peace, freedom and 
independence unimpaired; 
Believing in the need to meet present challenges and new 
developments by co-operating with all peace and freedom loving 
nation, both within and outside the region, in the furtherance of 
world peace, stability and harmony; 
cognizant of the significant trend towards establishing 
nuclear-free zones, as in the Treaty for the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Lusaka Declaration 
proclaiming Africa as a nuclear-free zone, for the purpose of 
promoting world peace and security by reducing the areas of 
international conflicts and tension; 
Reiterating our commitment to the principle in the Bangkok 
Declaration which establishment ASEAN in 1967, that the countries 
of South East Asia share a primary responsibility for 
strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and 
ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development and 
that they are determined to ensure stability and security from 
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external interference in any form or manifestation in order to 
preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals 
and aspirations of their people; 
Agreeing that the neutralization of South East Asia is a 
desirable objective and that we should explore ways and means for 
bringing about its realization; and 
Convinced that the time is propitious for joint action to 
give effective expression to the deeply felt desire of the people 
of South East Asia to ensure the conditions of peace and 
stability indispensable to their independence and their economic 
social well-being; 
Do Hereby State: 
1. that Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand are determined to exert initially necessary efforts to 
secure the recognition of, respect for, South East Asia a Zone of 
Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free form any form of manner of 
interference of outside powers; 
2. that the South East Asian countries should make concerted 
efforts to broaden the areas of co-operation which would 
contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer relationship. 
Done at Kuala Lumpur on Saturday, the 27th of November 1971. 
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